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What Can the OECD Learn From the States?
Richard D. Pomp is the 
Alva P. Loiselle Professor of 
Law at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law.
A few months before 
the widespread 
devastation unleashed by 
the coronavirus 
pandemic, nearly 140 
countries agreed to 
formulate a plan for 
modernizing the income 
taxation of multinational 
corporations. The director of the OECD’s Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration acknowledged 
that the date “may look a bit insane,” but the 
alternative is the risk of trade wars based on tax 
disputes. Today — in the middle of a global 
economic depression — that risk looks downright 
tame. The real risk is that the implosion of 
economies throughout the world will lead 
countries to recede to the basest and darkest of 
human emotions.
Insane or not, the end of 2020 is no longer 
aspirational but has now become a critical 
deadline. The pandemic has made taxing 
jurisdictions around the world desperate for 
money if their institutions are to survive. The 
OECD needs to recognize that the states 
developed a better mousetrap in dealing with 
cross-jurisdictional corporations. It is time their 
experiences should be recognized as a model to be 
emulated.
A. Historical Perspective4
Necessity is the mother of invention, and at 
the beginning of the 20th century the states were 
forced to develop a better alternative to federal 
transfer pricing and sourcing rules. Long before 
the dramatic rise of the multinationals after World 
War II, which started to expose the weaknesses in 
the federal rules and in the bilateral income tax 
treaties, the states had to respond to the challenge 
of taxing interstate corporations.
To deal with this, after a few inadequate starts, 
formulary apportionment emerged as the 
consensus approach in the early 20th century, 
building on the taxation of interstate railroads. 
Some states, under the intellectual leadership of 
California, started combining domestic related 
entities by the mid 1930s, which eliminated the 
need to police transfer prices and the shifting of 
profits to domestic tax havens (such as Nevada in 
the case of California). The apportionment 
formula would determine how much of the tax 
base a state could tax, substituting for the 
primitive federal sourcing rules.
The IRS was essentially indifferent to purely 
domestic interstate corporations, which typically 
filed consolidated returns. Consequently, 
interstate corporations posed no tax problem at 
the federal level, unlike the challenges they 
presented at the state level.
To be sure, there were a small number of U.S. 
corporations with foreign activities as early as the 
mid-19th century, such as the Singer 
Manufacturing Co. — incorporated in 1851 and 
often cited as the first U.S.-based multinational — 
selling sewing machines first in Europe and later 
in India, Australia, South Africa, and New 
Zealand. By the end of the 19th century, Singer 
was joined by other multinationals of the time, 
including Westinghouse, General Electric, 
Eastman Kodak, and Standard Oil.
B. The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Worldwide 
Combined Reporting
These multinationals presented special 
problems for both the IRS and the states, 
especially after World War II. The IRS used the 
federal transfer pricing and source rules, in the 
context of international tax treaties, and many 
states often piggybacked on this, accepting the 
resulting federal allocation of income as their 
starting point.5 But some states that were 
combining domestic corporations went further, 
and extended this technique to include foreign 
entities, a method known as worldwide combined 
reporting.
4
See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, 9th ed. 2019, pp. 10-1 
through 10-8; 10-40 through 10-79.
5
One early exception was New York. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton 
Limited v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
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The major advantages are obvious. Tax havens 
are combined, bringing their income back into the 
tax base. The need for the global intangible low-
taxed income (GILTI) regime and similar 
approaches is eliminated. Tax minimization 
games built around income shifting are undercut, 
if not fully stopped. The manipulation of tax 
treaties is eliminated.
Although a tax treaty with the United 
Kingdom unsuccessfully tried to halt mandatory 
worldwide combined reporting, political pressure 
from the Reagan administration bullied 
California and those in its fold to stop using this 
approach. The lesson for the OECD (and the EU) 
is that this retrenchment was political in nature 
and not because of administrative obstacles 
(although critics would allege otherwise).
C. Production vs. Market6
Much of the European debate is over how to 
assign the tax base between the production 
country and the market country. The states have 
fought this battle at least since 1957 when the 
Uniform Law Commission brought us the 
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 
(UDITPA). UDITPA sets forth an evenly weighted 
three-factor formula, using property, payroll, and 
sales. In the case of tangible personal property, 
sales are attributed to the state in which the goods 
are delivered or shipped. That formula thus 
incorporates two production or origin factors 
(property and payroll) and one market factor 
(sales).
For all other sales, most notably services, 
UDITPA assigns the receipts using what is known 
as the costs of performance approach. In this case, 
there is an all-or-nothing approach: The one state 
in which the greatest costs of income-producing 
activities occurs receives all the receipts. (Some 
states reject this all-or-nothing approach and 
utilize a proportional methodology.)
Of special interest to the OECD (and the EU) 
is the dissatisfaction with the production bias 
inherent in the costs of performance approach. 
Instead, states have been replacing that approach 
by using a market-based approach to the sales 
factor (and some go even further, apportioning 
income using only sales). The MTC, probably the 
greatest depository of intellectual firepower in the 
field, has spent two years drafting exhaustive 
rules designing different approaches to market-
based sourcing depending on the type of 
transaction involved.
The OECD should design its own formula, 
factors, and their respective weighting, but the 
MTC has done the heavy intellectual lifting. And 
the MTC has special formulas for special 
industries.
D. Nexus
With the fairly recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.,7 the physical presence 
rule imposed under the commerce clause was 
rejected in sales tax cases, similar to the 
movement to eliminate the PE rule that is at the 
heart of existing bilateral income tax treaties. The 
experience of the states post-Wayfair is another 
source that can be drawn upon. Moreover, long 
before Wayfair, the states were imposing economic 
nexus rules in their income taxes. The MTC 
developed “factor presence” rules for nexus, 
which incorporated economic nexus approaches. 
Free of any commerce clause constraint, the 
OECD can also draw on this experience in 
designing its nexus rules.
E. Adopting Mandatory Worldwide Combined 
Reporting
Without a commerce clause to deal with, the 
OECD has more latitude than the American states 
to adopt a worldwide combined approach. (All 
the U.S. litigation over the definition of a unitary 
business, a precondition under the commerce 
clause to combination, would be irrelevant.) Once 
again, the MTC and the states have relevant 
experience to draw on. Mandatory worldwide 
combined reporting, with a well-designed 
apportionment formula, is a better alternative to 
the OECD’s agenda. It deals better with tax 
havens, transfer pricing, defining specific types of 
businesses, such as digital or “consumer-facing,” 
profit shifting, and the allocation of overhead. It 
6
See Richard D. Pomp, Report of the Hearing Officer, Multistate Tax 
Compact Article IV, [UDITPA], Proposed Amendments (2013).
7
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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nicely addresses the digital economy and 
undercuts many tax minimization strategies.
F. The Combined Tax Base
One area in which the state experience will not 
be useful, however, is the nature of the tax base to 
be combined. Neither UDITPA nor the MTC 
addresses this critical issue. International 
accounting standards and the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base could fill the 
void as a starting point. I have enough friends 
who are financial accountants and who, like tax 
lawyers, can make anything so complicated that 
the temptation is to throw up our collective hands 
in frustration. Experienced draftspersons know, 
however, that “the perfect is the enemy of the 
good.” Persons working in good faith and with an 
urgent sense of mission can arrive at something 
good enough to be workable.
Helen Hecht’s contribution in this installment 
summarizes the OECD’s ambitious 11 “work 
streams.” The states have much to offer in 
resolving the issues addressed by these work 
streams. It is unnecessary for the OECD (or the 
EU) to reinvent the wheel when the states already 
own the original patent.
G. Administering a Worldwide Combined 
Reporting
Many countries will be unable to administer a 
worldwide combined reporting regime without 
help. My preference would be for a 
nongovernmental organization that has the 
capability, expertise, and sophisticated personnel 
who can climb the needed learning curve, to take 
on this burden on behalf of all countries. The 
OECD, the U.N., the IMF, or the World Bank 
would be logical candidates. Resistance can be 
expected, of course, to this new global tax and the 
resulting international bureaucracy, with 
conspiracy fanatics being unleashed and warning 
of “black helicopters” and “world domination.” 
But the real fear is not this lunacy, but rather the 
dystopian world we will be moving toward if 
there is not sufficient revenue to rebuild 
economies and bolster democratic institutions by 
the end of 2020.
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